A long-dormant crisis erupted in Balochistan in 1973 into an
insurgency that lasted four years and became increasingly bitter. The
insurgency was put down by the Pakistan Army, which employed brutal
methods and equipment, including Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships,
provided by Iran and flown by Iranian pilots. The deep-seated Baloch
nationalism based on tribal identity had international as well as
domestic aspects. Divided in the nineteenth century among Iran,
Afghanistan, and British India, the Baloch found their aspirations
and traditional nomadic life frustrated by the presence of national
boundaries and the extension of central administration over their
lands. Moreover, many of the most militant Baloch nationalists were
also vaguely Marxist-Leninist and willing to risk Soviet protection
for an autonomous Balochistan. As the insurgency wore on, the
influence of a relatively small but disciplined liberation front
seemed to increase.
Bhutto was able to mobilize domestic support for his drive against
the Baloch. Punjab's support was most tangibly represented in the use
of the army to put down the insurgency. One of the main Baloch
grievances was the influx of Punjabi settlers, miners, and traders
into their resource-rich but sparsely populated lands. Bhutto could
also invoke the idea of national integration with effect in the
aftermath of Bengali secession. External assistance to Bhutto was
generously given by the shah of Iran, who feared a spread of the
insurrection among the Iranian Baloch. Some foreign governments
feared that an independent or autonomous Balochistan might allow the
Soviet Union to develop and use the port at Gwadar, and no outside
power was willing to assist the Baloch openly or to sponsor the cause
of Baloch autonomy. During the mid-1970s, Afghanistan was preoccupied
with its own internal problems and seemingly anxious to normalize
relations with Pakistan. India was fearful of further balkanization
of the subcontinent after Bangladesh, and the Soviet Union did not
wish to jeopardize the leverage it was gaining with Pakistan.
However, during the Bhutto regime hostilities in Balochistan were
protracted. The succeeding Zia ul-Haq government took a more moderate
approach, relying more on economic development to placate the Baloch.
Bhutto proceeded cautiously in the field of land reform and did not
fulfill earlier promises of distributing land to the landless on the
scale he had promised, as he was forced to recognize and to cultivate
the sociopolitical influence of landowners. However, he did not
impede the process of consolidation of tenancy rights and acquisition
of mid-sized holdings by servicemen. Punjab was the vital
agricultural region of Pakistan; it remained a bastion of support for
the government.
Bhutto specifically targeted the powerful and privileged Civil
Service of Pakistan (CSP) and introduced measures of administrative
reform with the declared purpose of limiting the paternalistic power
of the bureaucracy. The CSP, however, had played the role of guardian
alongside the army since independence. Many of its members reacted
badly to Bhutto's politicizing appointments, for which patronage
seemed a more important criterion than merit or seniority.
Relations with India were, at best, uneven during the Bhutto period.
He accomplished the return of the prisoners of war through the Simla
Agreement of 1972, but no settlement of the key problem of Kashmir
was possible beyond an agreement that any settlement should be
peaceful. Bhutto reacted strongly to the detonation of a nuclear
device by India in 1974 and pledged that Pakistan would match that
development even if Pakistanis had to "eat grass" to cover the cost.
Bhutto claimed success for his economic policies. The gross national
product and the rate of economic growth climbed. Inflation fell from
25 percent in fiscal year 1972 to 6 percent in FY 1976, although
other economic measures he introduced did not perform as well.
Bhutto pointed out that his foreign policy had brought Pakistan
prestige in the Islamic world, peace if not friendship with India,
and self-respect in dealings with the great powers. He felt assured
of victory in any election. Therefore, with commitment to a
constitutional order at stake, in January 1977 he announced he would
hold national and provincial assembly elections in March.
The response of the opposition to this news was vigorous. Nine
political parties ranging across the ideological spectrum formed a
united front--the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Fundamentalist
Muslims were satisfied by the adoption of Nizam-i-Mustafa,
meaning "Rule of the Prophet," as the front's slogan. Modern secular
elements, however, respected the association of Air Marshal Asghar
Khan. The PNA ran candidates for almost all national and provincial
seats. As curbs on the press and political activity were relaxed for
the election campaign, an apparently strong wave of support for the
PNA swept Pakistan's cities. This prompted a whirlwind tour of the
country by Bhutto, with all his winning charm in the forefront. In
the background lurked indirect curbs on free expression as well as
political gangsterism.
National Assembly election results were announced on March 7,
proclaiming the PPP the winner with 155 seats versus thirty-six seats
for the PNA. Expecting trouble, Bhutto invoked Section 144 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which restricted assembly for political
reasons. The PNA immediately challenged the election results as
rigged and demanded a new election--not a recount. Bhutto refused,
and a mass protest movement was launched against him. Religious
symbols were used by both sides to mobilize agitation; for example,
Bhutto imposed prohibitions on the consumption of alcoholic beverages
and on gambling. Despite talks between Bhutto and opposition leaders,
the disorders persisted as a multitude of frustrations were vented.
The army intervened on July 5, took all political leaders including
Bhutto into custody, and proclaimed martial law.