Rafsanjani or Ahmadinejad

The Baloch of Pahlavi-occupied Balochistan confront four major problems: 1) Economically, they are among the poorest. 2) Educationally they are among the most backward. 3) Culturally, they are among the worst victims of Persian chauvinism and racism. And, 4) internationally, they are seriously affected by the mode of Tehran-Islamabad relations. The first two phenomena are the logical results of the third. So, the real problems are the racist Persian chauvinism and the nature of Tehran-Islamabad relations. The less chauvinist and less likely among Iranians to be close to Islamabad could be considered a lesser evil for the Baloch.

Complete emancipation is out of question. Thanks to the Chaakar-Gwahraam syndrome, selfishness and corruption of the top leadership of the three of the four 'nationalist' groups of Eastern Balochistan, the Baloch nation missed the train again. By the time the next train comes -- if it comes at all -- the desolated Bugti-Mari area will be the only Balochi speaking Baloch majority region surrounded by Punjabi-Muhajir-Pashtun cantonments. So, in present circumstances, we have to deal with those in power in Tehran.

After Marxism, an internationalist religious ideology is the only force expected to defend the weaker against the chauvinist type of stronger in a multi-ethnic multi-nation Muslim state. The more sincere (or fanatic) believers of such an internationalist religion could be expected to be more dependable and less dangerous by the weaker ethnic, linguistic etc Muslim groups.

Regardless of our likes or dislikes, the so-called hard-liners of Tehran are among the more sincere or more fanatic believers in such a religious ideology. Their first loyalty is to their Islam rather than the Persian heritage. This commitment to Islam binds them to treat all Muslim nations within their jurisdiction equally regardless of differences in color, culture, ethnicity, language and race. Their revolutionary and populist Islam also binds them to be on the side of the poor and downtrodden.One can tell just by looking at the pictures of Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad who is more likely to be with the poor and who with the secular and religious fat guys in Balochistan!

Obviously, I am not giving much importance to the Sunni-Shii divide. Because, first of all, it is humbug. Our people should be concerned with their bread -and-butter-related issues and with all that make them Baloch, their language and other symbols of their culture. Second, emphasis on the Shii- Sunni divide will divide the Baloch themselves further. Third, the hardliners of Tehran confronted by the US and desiring to be recognized as the heroes of the Muslim world will do their best to have the cooperation and good will of all Muslims including the Sunnis. They are also smart enough not to insist on practicing the Safavi model of partisan Shiism in the 21st century and cultured enough not to imitate the Taliban. And a last point in this context: the worst and most powerful enemies of the Shiite hardliners belong to their own ethno-sectarian (Persian-Shiite) constituency, within the country and abroad. In such a situation, the hardliners need more the goodwill and support of the non-Shiite non-Persian Iranians.

Unless guided and led by the Left clearly, a so-called reform or revolution movement in Iran is inevitably infiltrated and eventually controlled by our worst enemies: the non-religious (so-called secular)Pan-Iranist Persian chauvinists ... and the upper bourgeoisie dominated by the Persian capitalists including the bazaris ... as it is the case today.

I suspect that the ongoing policy of comparative liberalization concerning non-Persian regions, languages, cultures and heritage is spearheaded or initiated by the followers and supporters of Khamanai in the regime -- may be inspired by himself -- rather than the so-called reformist elements supporting Rafsanjani, Khatami, Moin, and now Rafsanjani again. We know definitely know that both the Royalists and the National Fronters of all kinds are vehemently opposed to the recent changes in curriculum etc. -- or proposals -- introduced by the Islamic regime aimed at giving some more importance to regional languages, cultures and heritage.

All indicators tell us that after the early revolutionary upheavals and the devastating Iran-Iraq war, the Baloch regions have progressed, economically and educationally. This progress is being shared by more and more commoners among the Baloch. Unlike the past, it is not limited to a few elitist and collaborating families, nor exclusively related to anti-Baloch military build-up in the region.

I have great respect for the Persian and other Iranian intellectuals who want sincerely to live in an enlightened and free secular Iran. There are also signs indicating that an increasing number of them is open to the idea of federalism. Yet, the present so-called reform movement is dominated by those who are 'missing' the 'freedom' of flaunting their mini-skirts and vulgarly luxurious life-style. To have or not to have this kind of freedom is not the problem of a typical Baloch woman or man. The freedom to have a beer or two on a weekend --- or occasionally a drink of vodka-tonic -- may be important for a Malek Towghi; it is, however not so important for an average Baloch or Iranian.

In present circumstances, a so-called reformist regime in Iran will have to follow the American definition of reform and liberalization if it (the reformed Iranian regime) wants to maintain 'good' relations with the US. For Americans, reform means privatization of all national resources and institutions including educational ones ... and complete unrestricted investment of capital by any one who has the capital. This will mean that non-Baloch billionaires such as Rafsanjani will have freedom to buy, own and run as much as they want in Balochistan.

Let us be clear: Unless we have the guarantee that the resources and property in Balochistan will be owned overwhelmingly by the Baloch -- and that also equitably -- , the state/ustan/province ownership and the state/ustan/province management of common national resources and institutions is a lesser evil than than their privatization.

A so-called reformed regime in Tehran is likely to have more friendly and intimate relations with Islamabad. Based on our past experience, we the Baloch know what intimate friendship between Pakistan and Iran means for us.

Let me insert a last point here: Yes, the Muslim world needs a bold re-interpretation the Sharia, and consequently, a Re-formation of its religious thought in order to make Islam compatible with realities. The masses will accept such an interpretation only when it comes from the Islamic High Clergy. For various reasons which I can not detail here, I believe that the revolutionary Shiite High Clergy is more likely to initiate and spearhead such a desired reinterpretation of the Shariah leading to a genuine and effective Reformation in Islam.