BEFORE getting into the nitty-gritty of the Balochistan problem, it is necessary to understand it in the context of the perception that the antagonists have of each other as evident from their statements and actions. While the government in Islamabad considers the Baloch leadership as unfriendly, defiant, rigid, narrow-minded, backward looking, ungrateful and unpatriotic; the Baloch leaders regard the federal government as arrogant, unsympathetic, partisan, exploitative and indifferent.

A manifestation of this has been that rarely have the genuine leaders of Balochistan been given a free hand to administer their province and the leaders have not accepted, without reservation, the writ and rule of Islamabad or acknowledged the good work done in the field of development and uplift of the province. This attitude has created an atmosphere of perpetual mistrust and conflict.

Like any other isolated and economically underdeveloped people blessed with enormous natural resources, the people of Balochistan entertain deep suspicion of “outsiders” who they think are out to exploit their resources depriving them of their livelihood. This may be an exaggerated view but it is so ingrained in their psyche that to mitigate this feeling require a Herculean effort based on understanding, tact and mutual trust. Unfortunately the Pakistani bureaucracy, which came into intimate contact with the people of Balochistan after the formation of the One Unit, were not equipped with these tools, with the result that, instead of understanding and smooth relationship, there was misunderstanding and hostility.

One of the early military actions, after the creation of Pakistan, was taken in Balochistan to compel the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan. The next conflict erupted after the amalgamation of the different regions of Pakistan into one unit in 1955, followed by other actions in 1965 and 1966. The major challenge to the authority of the government came in 1973 when the Peoples’ Party government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the duly elected government of Ataullah Mengal on the spurious charges of smuggling of foreign arms through the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad and imprisoned the entire nationalist leadership. The Baloch “insurgents” confronted the Pakistan army in sporadic and pitched battles. This lasted for almost four years and ended with the promulgation of Martial Law in 1977, when General Ziaul Huq freed all the nationalist leaders from Hyderabad jail.

Besides repeated military operations and persistent incarceration of Baloch leaders, the other factors which alienated the people of Balochistan were the formation of One Unit in 1955 and Ayub Khan’s martial law in 1958. One Unit was the male-fide imposition of the central government authority by dismantling the political and administrative machinery of the provinces. One Unit, because of its cumbersome bureaucratic structure and the remoteness of its system of governance, created such bad blood that any marginal benefits, which could have accrued as a result of pooling of the financial and administrative resources of the provinces and the federation, resulted in exacerbating the existing mistrust and apathy.

Smaller provinces felt and perhaps rightly that they had been deprived of whatever meagre autonomy they had. It is a fact that the One Unit had made the already miserable life of the people of smaller provinces only more so. Imagine the plight of a man from Kharan or Mekran in Balochistan or from Dir or Kohistan in the Frontier Province going to Lahore to peruse his land case with the Board of Revenue there. The commissioners and the deputy commissioners had become mere post offices. Another factor, which alienated the people of the smaller provinces, was the swarming of the divisional and district headquarters with officers from outside — mainly from the superior services who had very little knowledge of local customs and traditions as most of them had never served in political agencies. They hardly knew the local languages.

Here I am reminded of an encounter which I witnessed personally. President Ayub had come to Quetta to see and review development work undertaken by the government in Balochistan. He was presiding over a meeting of the heads of various departments at the Quetta residency. During the meeting at some point he started admonishing the officers for not doing enough. One outspoken officer from the Frontier Province asked Ayub’s permission to speak.

Permission granted, he said, ‘Sir you may be right in critisizing us for inefficiency but you should also know the reasons. The officers that are posted in Balochistan are either those whom the government wants to unduly favour by giving them out-of-turn promotion or those who are out of favour and need to be punished. Now, Sir, the officers belonging to the first category after securing their promotion start manoeuvring to get posted elsewhere. The officers of the other category spend a disgruntled life and are only interested in getting their salary. Sir, tell me how much productive work can you expect from such a lot.’

To this, Ayub’s reply was a cryptic grunt, “I hope it is not so”. What the officer told the president may not be entirely correct but it is an apt comment on the government’s attitude to smaller provinces, particularly Balochistan. Ayub Khan’s eleven years rule compounded the alienation of the smaller provinces as they rightly thought that because of its background and peculiar mind- set, army will have no sympathy for their difficulties and predicaments. Moreover Balochistan had practically no representation in the armed forces and had no expectation of any sympathetic treatment. The fears of Balochs proved correct as they were subjected to all sorts of oppression. No doubt, there was some developmental activity but as far as the people’s participation in having a say in their affairs, it was just not there.

The military’s attitude has always been that they know the best what is good for an area and its people and what they do has to be accepted without any questioning. The Balochs were not prepared for this, with the result that all their top leadership remained imprisoned for long periods. The Bugti chief, Akbar Khan, was deposed and given death sentence on a trumped-up murder charge. But the most bizarre incident was the hanging of eleven Baloch nationalists after the government had given them amnesty.

As a reaction to the humiliating arrest of the Khan Of Kalat, some Baloch nationalist, headed by the octogenarian Nauroz Khan Zehri, took to the hills and started harassing the para-military forces. This continued with varying intensity for more than a year when the government, at the intercession of some friendly elements, persuaded the so-called rebels to come down from the hills on the explicit promise that they would be pardoned.

However after their surrender they were arrested and subsequently hanged. Sardar Nauroz Khan, because of his old age, was given life imprisonment. This was unprecedented in the history of the tribal area as a promise once given was always honoured at all cost. This betrayal by the government is even today quoted as an example of it’s untrustworthiness.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s civilian rule, which followed Ayub’s military regime, proved worse for the Baloch, yearning for self-rule as Bhutto proved to be an ardent exponent of a centralized set- up. He was also a very intolerant person and did not brook any personal or political opposition. Thus when in the 1970 elections his Peoples’ Party did not win a single seat in Balochistan and he had to reluctantly accede to the formation of an NAP-JUI coalition government.

But from the outset he was creating hurdles in its way. First he appointed Sardar Ghous Bakhsh Raisani, a political opponent of Chief Minister Sardar Ataullah Mengal as the governor of the province and then created the drama of the recovery of Russian arms from the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad alleged to have been destined for Balochistan. He used this as an excuse for dismissing the Mengal ministry.

Thus the dream of the people of Balochistan for limited self — rule were shattered in a mere ten months’ time. This infuriated the Baloch people who considered this action of the federal government as wholly unjustified and started an insurgency in eastern Balochistan which subsequently spread to other parts of the province.

It was estimated that about nine thousand persons were killed on both sides. All Baloch leaders were arrested and put in Hyderabad jail where a conspiracy trial was started. This continued for almost four years and ended with the ouster of the Bhutto government and promulgation of martial law in 1977.

The next two decades remained uneventful in the sense that both sides avoided confrontation. General Ziaul Haq released all the Baloch leaders and terminated the special tribunal which was trying them in Hyderabad jail. If the government avoided any repressive action in Balochistan, Baloch leaders too had become more chastened because of long incarceration, although they conceded nothing to the military government.

During the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif regimes there was almost normality. The presidents and the prime ministers of the time were happy to visit the province once or twice in a year and left the local affairs to the elected governments (some of them left a tail of corruption and nepotism behind them).

The tragedy of Balochistan is that the affairs of the province are taken seriously only when there is an armed conflict or insurgency there. This is what has happened recently too. The government started giving attention to Balochistan when gas pipelines were repeatedly blown up and many areas of the country were plunged into darkness and industrial activity disrupted, resulting in huge economic losses.

This prompted the government to announce an impressive package for the province, particularly its readiness to seriously consider the autonomy and royalty questions, ensuring employment for the local people and giving the local officers their due quota in the federal institutions. If implemented expeditiously and without any reservations, it can go a long way in meeting the genuine grievances of the people of Balochistan. In fact, it can be a trailblazer for the other provinces as well.

The story of Balochistan is a saga of avoidable confrontation, neglect, wrong priorities, blunders, dithering, missed opportunities, halfway measures taken at the wrong time, suspected loyalties and mutual mistrust. The people of Balochistan are a proud people who do not like to be patronized but want to be treated with dignity and respect, being equal partners in the running of the country.

The federal government has to understand that there can be no lasting peace in the province till such time that the genuine aspirations of the people are met. Obsession with excessive centralization has not worked. Similarly, the leadership of Balochistan has to realize that their province is an integral part of Pakistan and their demands for autonomy have to be within these parameters. Their province is situated in a sensitive region bordering with volatile Afghanistan and nosey Iran and involves special security considerations.

Their attitude of hostility and rigidity has not served any purpose. It would be wise if they join hands with the democratic forces in the country and ensure a truly civilian rule and use democratic means to achieve their goals.

The writer is a former ambassador